Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2006

Can The International Criminal Court Accept A Referral From The
United Nations Security Council Of The Murder Of Former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri?
Madhusha Dissanayake

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dissanayake, Madhusha, "Can The International Criminal Court Accept A Referral From The United
Nations Security Council Of The Murder Of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri?" (2006). War
Crimes Memoranda. 132.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/132

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

ISSUE:
CAN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ACCEPT A REFERRAL FROM
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE MURDER OF FORMER
LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER RAFIK HARIRI?

Prepared by Madhusha Dissanayake
Spring 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS .......................................... 1
A.

Issues............................................................................................................................ 1

B.

Summary of Conclusions ........................................................................................... 1
1.

There Is Not Enough Evidence for the UN Security Council to Refer the
Assassination of Mr. Hariri to the ICC........................................................... 1

2.

The Murder of Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri Was Likely Not a
Crime Against Humanity. ................................................................................ 2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 3
A.

Lebanese-Syrian Relations ........................................................................................ 3

B.

Murder ........................................................................................................................ 8

C.

Lebanese Investigation............................................................................................... 9

D.

UN Involvement/Investigation ................................................................................ 10

E.

Syrian Investigation ................................................................................................. 13

F.

Suspects ..................................................................................................................... 14

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION...................................................................................................... 14
A.

B.

Referral by the Security Council to the ICC Pursuant to Article 13(b).............. 14
1.

Darfur, Sudan.................................................................................................. 15

2.

Statutory Requirements for the Prosecutor to Take the Hariri Case........ 18
a.

There Is No Reasonable Basis to Believe That a Crime Within the
ICC’s Jurisdiction Has Occurred. ....................................................... 18

b.

The Case May Be Admissible Under Article 17. ................................ 18

c.

There Are No Substantial Reasons to Believe That an Investigation
Would Not Serve the Interests of Justice. ........................................... 22

Crimes Against Humanity....................................................................................... 23
1.
Legislative History of Crimes Against Humanity and the Rome Statute .. 24

i

2.

Elements of Crimes Against Humanity ........................................................ 26
a.

One or More Persons Killed ................................................................. 27

b.

Existence of a Widespread or Systematic Attack ............................... 27

c.

Against a Civilian Population............................................................... 29

d.

In Furtherance of a State or Organizational Policy to Commit Such
an Attack. ............................................................................................... 32

e.

Mens Rea- Knowledge........................................................................... 33

IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 35
CHART 1 ..................................................................................................................................... 37

ii

INDEX AUTHORITIES
Treaties
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF,183/9.
2. U.N. Charter.
UN Resolutions and Documents
3. Int’l Indep. Investigation Comm’n, Report of the International Independent Investigation
Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595(2005), U.N. Doc.
S/2005/662 (Oct. 19, 2005) (prepared by Detlev Mehlis).
4. Int’l Indep. Investigation Comm’n, Second Report of the International Independent
Investigation Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1595
(2005) and 1636 (2005), U.N. Doc. S/2005/775 (Dec. 10, 2005) (prepared by Detlev
Mehlis).
5. Press Release, Security Council, Head Investigator into Killing of Rafik Hariri Briefs
Security Council, Says Progress Made in Understanding Circumstances, Modus
Operandi. Cannot Publicly Discuss Details of Current Lines of Inquiry, but Optimistic
Those Responsible Will Be Identified, Held Accountable, U.N. Doc SC/8663 (Mar. 16,
2006).
6. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Establishes Commission to Assist
Investigation into Beirut Bombing That Killed Former Lebanese Prime Minister, U.N.
Doc. SC/8353 (July 4, 2005).
7. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005).
8. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court Addendum:
Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2
(2000).
9. S.C. Res. 1559, U.N. Doc S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004).
10. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
11. S.C. Res. 1595, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1595 (Apr. 7, 2005).
12. S.C. Res. 1636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (Oct. 31, 2005).
13. S.C. Res. 1644, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1644 (Dec. 15, 2005).

iii

14. S.C. Res. 1664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006).
15. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of
Resolution 1644 (2005), U.N. Doc. S/2006/176 (Mar. 21, 2006).
16. U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon
Inquiring into the Causes, Circumstances and Consequences of the Assassination of
Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, March 24, 2005, U.N. Doc. S/2005/203 (Mar. 24,
2005) (prepared by Peter Fitzgerald).
ICC Documents
17. Christopher Keith Hall, Suggestions Concerning International Criminal Court
Prosecutorial Policy and Strategy and External Relations (Mar. 28, 2003),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/hall.pdf.
18. International Criminal Court, Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues before the
Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications, http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy_annex_final_210404.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
19. International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, http://www.icccpi.int/statesparties.html (Nov. 14, 2005).
20. Louis Moreno Ocampo, Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Mr. Louis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)
(June 6, 2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC_Darfur_UNSC_Report_29-06-05_EN.pdf.
21. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur
to ICC Prosecutor, (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/98.html.
22. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Mr. Luis Moreno
Ocampo to the Security Council on 29 June 2005 Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/LMO_UNSC_On_DARFUR-EN.pdf.
23. See generally Xabier Agirre et al., Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of
Complementarity in Practice (2003), http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf.

Court and Tribunal Cases
24. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).

iv

25. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (May 7, 1997).
Treatises and Books
26. LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (2005).
27. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2002).
28. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO
IMPUNITY (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
Journal and Law Review Articles
29. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International
Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 385 (2005).
30. Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73 (2004).
31. Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes
Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307, 315 (2000).
32. Kail C. Ellis, Lebanon: The Struggle of a Small Country in a Regional Context, ARAB
STUDIES Q. , Winter 1999, at 5.
33. Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in
International Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 789-90 (2003).
34. Gary C. Gambill, Is Syria Losing Control of Lebanon?, MIDDLE EAST Q., Spring 2001, at
41.
35. William Harris, Bashar al-Assad’s Lebanon Gamble, MIDDLE EAST Q., Summer 2005, at
33.
36. Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 (1998).
37. Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, The Road From Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes
Against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 335 (2000).
38. Daniel Pipes, Upheaval in Syria and Lebanon: “We Don’t Need Syria in Lebanon”,
MIDDLE EAST Q., Sept. 2000, at 21.
Miscellaneous

v

39. Barbara Slavin, U.S., France Consider U.N. Sanctions Against Syria, USA TODAY, Oct.
24, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-23-syriaaction_x.htm.
40. Brammertz Meets Syria’s Moallem on Hariri Probe, YALIBNAN, Feb. 23, 2006,
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/brammertz_meets.php.
41. Detlev Mehlis, Comm’r Int’l Indep. Investigation Comm’n , United Nations Security
Council Meting to Discuss the Mehlis Report (Dec. 13, 2005).
42. EU Will Impose Sanctions on Suspects in Hariri’s Murder, YALIBNAN, Feb. 23, 2006,
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/eu_will_impose.php.
43. Hussein Dakroub, Syria Ending 29-Year Military Domination of Lebanon, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 24, 2005.
44. Lebanese Judges Head to UN for Talks on Hariri Tribunal, LEBANONWIRE, Feb. 21,
2006, http://www.lebanonwire.com/0602LN/06022101LWAF.asp.
45. Marwan Hamadeh Escapes Assassination Bid, MIDDLE EAST ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2004,
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=11437.
46. New Evidence Points to Syrian Involvement in Hariri Murder, UN NEWS SERVICES, Dec.
13, 2005, http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=16917.
47. Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Did the Execution of Baghdad Merchants in July of 1992
Amount to Any Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Iraqi Special Tribunal? (Summer
2005), www.law.case.edu/War-Crimes-Research-Portal.
48. Rym Ghazal, Judges Visit UN to Discuss Hariri Trial, THE DAILY STAR, Feb. 20, 2006,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=22342.
49. Syria Raising Funds to Pay for Defense of Hariri Murder Suspects, YALIBNAN, Apr. 22,
2006, http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/04/syria_raising_f.php.
50. Transcript of Tape Recording, The Struggle for Lebanese Independence: One Year After
Hariri’s Assassination (Mar. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060306.pdf.
51. Tribunal of Hariri Assassination to Be Set, ARABICNEWS.COM, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/060126/2006012618.html.

vi

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues*
On February 14, 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others were
killed in Beirut. This memorandum addresses whether there is enough evidence to have the
assassination of Mr. Hariri referred to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) by the United
Nations (“UN”) Security Council. In order for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction in this case,
the assassination of Mr. Hariri must constitute one of the limited number of international crimes
over which the ICC has jurisdiction. Accordingly, this memorandum also addresses whether the
assassination of Mr. Hariri constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome
Statute.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. There Is Not Enough Evidence for the UN Security Council to Refer the
Assassination of Mr. Hariri to the ICC.
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute1 allows the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over crimes
referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations.2 Once a referral has been made to the ICC, the Prosecutor decides whether
to accept the case and begin an investigation.3 According to Article 53, the Prosecutor considers
three factors to determine whether to initiate an investigation: (1) whether the information before

*Lebanon-Syria Investigation and Murder as a Crime Against Humanity. Examine the Mehlis Reports by the UN
Prosecutor about the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. Consider all the murders surrounding the death
of Hariri. Is there enough evidence to have this matter referred to the ICC (assuming it was referred by the Security
Council)? What would have to be proved to bring the crimes within the purview of the ICC? (Note, FYI, that Serge
Brammerts, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, is now the lead Prosecutor on leave from the ICC).
1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.A/CONF,183/9 [hereinafter
Rome Statute] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

2

U.N. Charter [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

3

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 53.

1

“the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court has” occurred; (2) whether the case is admissible under Article 17; and (3) whether there
are any “substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of
justice.”4
Provided that the UN Security Council refers this case, the Prosecutor will most likely
not accept the case and begin an investigation of the murder of Mr. Hariri because the first factor
is not met. A reasonable basis to believe that the murder of Mr. Hariri constitutes a crime against
humanity, which is within the jurisdiction of the ICC, does not exist.5 The other two factors,
however, are satisfied. Assuming that Lebanon wants the murder to be tried before the ICC, the
case is admissible under Article 17.6 Lastly, there are no “substantial reasons to believe that an
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”7
2. The Murder of Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri Was Likely Not a Crime
Against Humanity.
Crimes against humanity are defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.8 This crime would
most likely fall under Article 7(1)(a) criminalizing murder.9 There are five elements to crimes
against humanity: (1) “the perpetrator killed one or more persons”;10 (2) the murders were part of
widespread or systematic attack; (3) the attack was directed against a civilian population; (4) the
4

Id.

5

Crimes against humanity is one of four listed crimes that the Court has jurisdiction over. Id. at art. 5(1)(b).

6

Id. at art. 17.

7

Id. at art. 53.

8

Id. at art. 7.

9

Id.

10

Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of
the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes]
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]. See also, Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 7(1)(a).

2

attack was committed in furtherance of a State or organizational policy; and (5) the perpetrator(s)
had knowledge of the attack.11 The explosion that killed Mr. Hariri and 22 others likely satisfies
all of these elements, except for the third one.
First, a total of 23 people died due to the explosion on February 14, 2005, therefore the
initial element is satisfied. Second, though the murders were not part of a widespread attack,
they may constitute a systematic attack because there was probably a high degree of planning
and orchestration that went into the successful assassination.12 Third, the attack was not directed
against enough people to be classified as being directed against a civilian population. Fourth,
there is evidence that there was a policy by top Syrian and Lebanese security officials to
influence Lebanese politics and resist the opposition movement in Lebanon.13 Lastly, the
perpetrators most likely had knowledge of the attack if the suspects being tried are the top Syrian
and Lebanese security officials.14
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The murder of Mr. Hariri occurred in a time of heightened political tension between
Lebanon and Syria. It is no coincidence that Mr. Hariri’s murder occurred only a few months
prior to the holding of parliamentary elections in March 2005. Since the murder Mr. Hariri there
have been demonstrations and unrest throughout Lebanon.
A. Lebanese-Syrian Relations

11

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 7.

12

Int’l Indep. Investigation Comm’n, Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595(2005), para. 123, U.N. Doc. S/2005/662 (Oct. 19, 2005) (prepared by
Detlev Mehlis) [hereinafter Mehlis Report] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

13

See generally Mehlis Report, supra note 12, paras. 23-30, & 124.

14

Id. at para. 124.

3

Syria has occupied Lebanon for almost three decades.15 A year after the outbreak of the
Lebanese civil war in 1976, Syrian troops moved into Lebanon.16 During Syria’s occupation of
Lebanon “[t]he Syrian regime determine[d] who filled the Lebanese government’s top positions,
supervised its foreign policy, and manipulated its elections.”17 During this time Syria held a
great deal of influence over Lebanese policy, and it had a strong grip on all Lebanese political
activity.18 The Syrians had infiltrated the Lebanese security agencies, bureaucracy, and political
structures.19 For example, a series of agreements were put in place to ensure Syrian control of
Lebanon, including the Orwellian May 1991 treaty of brotherhood, cooperation, and social
accords, the September 1991 defense and security pact, the September 1992 economic and social
accords, and the September 1994 arrangement for Syria to take the lion’s share of the Orontes
river water.20 The Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination “established a mixed
Higher Council to promote intergovernmental cooperation on economic, defense, culture and
energy issues.”21

15

William Harris, Bashar al-Assad’s Lebanon Gamble, MIDDLE EAST Q., Summer 2005, at 33, 33 [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
16

Id.

17

Id. Daniel Pipes, Upheaval in Syria and Lebanon: “We Don’t Need Syria in Lebanon”, MIDDLE EAST Q., Sept.
2000, at 21, 23 (“As a former Lebanese diplomat puts it, “Everyone knows that Syria controls everything in
Lebanon, totally.”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38]. Syria’s “takeover of [Lebanon] occurred
step by step, climaxing in 1990 with the domination of some 90 percent of the country.” Id. at 21.
18

Harris, supra note 15, at 33. Pipes, supra note 17, at 23 (“So subservient are Lebanese politicians to their suzerain
in Damascus, they routinely visit the Syrian capital before making any major decision or even resolving problems
among themselves.”).

19

Harris, supra note 15, at 35.

20

Id.

21

Kail C. Ellis, Lebanon: The Struggle of a Small Country in a Regional Context, ARAB STUDIES Q. , Winter 1999,
at 5, 17 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32]. Article I states:
The highest levels of cooperation and coordination in all fields, including political, economic,
security, educational, scientific, and others, with the aim of promoting the mutual interests of the
two sisterly states within the framework of their respective sovereignty and independence.

4

Syria’s occupation of Lebanon was highly beneficial to Syria. The occupation was a
major step towards Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad’s goal of “bringing all of ‘Greater Syria’
under Damascus’s direct control.”22 Syria’s presence in Lebanon, also, allowed Hafiz the
opportunity to engage with Israel in Lebanon without endangering Syria.23 In addition, Syria
derived “billions of dollars” from the occupation.24 Lebanon served as a source of income for
Hafiz and his officials, including an income from drug trafficking of more than a hundred million
dollars.25 Lebanon, also, served as place for unemployed Syrian workers to go and created a
“protected market for Syrian products.”26 Over a million Syrian workers reside in Lebanon
without paying taxes.27
It was not until Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and the succession of Bashar alAssad to the presidency in Syria that the Lebanese public became more vocal in their
“questioning of Syrian actions and involvement in Lebanon.”28 Bashar al-Assad was not
considered to be as politically astute as his father Hafiz al-Assad. 29 For example, “Druze leader

Id. at 17-18 (quoting Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Concluded Between Lebanon and
Syria on May 22, 1991, BEIRUT REVIEW, Fall 1991, at 115, 115-19).
22

Pipes, supra note 17, at 21-22.

23

Id.

24

Gary C. Gambill, Is Syria Losing Control of Lebanon?, MIDDLE EAST Q., Spring 2001, at 41, 48 [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

25

Pipes, supra note 17, at 21-22

26

Id.

27

Gambill, supra note 24, at 48.

28

Harris, supra note 15, at 35. Pipes, supra note 17, at 24. The Israelis withdrew on May 24, 2000. Id.

29

Gambill, supra note 24, at 41.

5

Walid Jumblatt repeatedly attacked Syrian interference in Lebanese domestic politics.”30 The
opposition to Syrian involvement in Lebanon was “becoming increasingly multi-sectarian.” 31
Tensions increased in Bashar al-Assad’s first presidential term. But Assad still
maintained control of Lebanon through three organizations: “the Syrian military intelligence
network based at Anjar in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley; Lahoud’s security machine, with the head of
Lebanon’s General Security Directorate, Jamil al-Sayyid, as Syria’s leading Lebanese gatekeeper; and a close liaison with Hezbollah, which preserved a sophisticated paramilitary
apparatus independent of Lebanese state control.”32 Tensions started to escalate when Assad
decided to override Lebanon’s constitution and extended the term of Lebanese president Emile
Lahoud, which was ending in November 2004.33
Prior to the extension of Lahoud’s term Mr. Hariri and Lahoud had “repeated conflicts
during Mr. Hariri’s term (2000-2004) to a point that required ‘external intervention and
mediation on a daily basis’.” 34 The difficulties that Mr. Hariri had dealing with Lahoud were
“widely interpreted as a sign of the Syrian Arab Republic’s mistrust of the former.”35 Then on
September 2, 2004, Resolution 1559 was adopted by the UN Security Council calling upon “all

30

Harris, supra note 15, at 36.

31

Gambill, supra note 24, at 45.

32

Harris, supra note 15, at 36.

33

Id. at 34.

34

U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon Inquiring into the Causes,
Circumstances and Consequences of the Assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, March 24, 2005, ¶
7, U.N. Doc. S/2005/203 (Mar. 24, 2005) (prepared by Peter Fitzgerald) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 16].

35

Id.

6

remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.”36 The UN adoption of the resolution was
widely thought to be the work of Mr. Hariri. The UN Fact-finding mission was told by many
sources “that the Syrian leadership had held Mr. Hariri personally responsible for the adoption of
the resolution, and that this resolution marked the end of whatever trust existed between the two
sides.”37
Bashar al-Assad, however, needed the support of Mr. Hariri’s bloc in parliament to
extend the term of Lahoud, something Mr. Hariri did not want to give.38 On August 27, 2004
Mr. Hariri met with Assad and Assad ordered him to have parliament amend the constitution to
allow Lahoud to remain in office for an additional three years. 39 At another meeting regarding
the extension of Lahoud’s term Assad told Mr. Hariri that “Mr. Lahoud should be viewed as his
personal representative in Lebanon and that ‘opposing him is tantamount to opposing Assad
himself’.” 40 Assad also reportedly said that he “‘would rather break Lebanon over the heads of
(Mr.) Hariri and (Druze leader Walid) Jumblatt than see his word in Lebanon broken’.”41 On
September 3 2004, Mr. Hariri’s bloc in parliament approved the constitutional amendment
extending the term of Lahoud.
On September 6 2004, Marwan Hamadeh, Economy and Trade Minister, quit to protest
the adoption of the constitutional amendment. One month later he was wounded and his guard

36

S.C. Res. 1559, U.N. Doc S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note 34, at ¶ 11.

37

U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note 34, at ¶ 11.

38

Id. at ¶ 8.

39

Harris, supra note 15, at 37.

40

U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note 34, at ¶ 10.

41

Id.

7

killed when a bomb exploded near his car.42 A heightened atmosphere of tension was present
after the attempted assassination.43 Soon after the attempted assassination, on October 4, 2004,
Mr. Hariri resigned as prime minister.44 Many people saw the assassination attempt as “a part of
the ongoing power struggle with the Syrian leadership.”45 However, by the end of early 2005 a
power bloc was emerging composed of members of a variety of political groups as an opposition
to Syrian domination in Lebanon.46 The power bloc was independent of Syrian influence and
was perceived to be able to win a majority in the upcoming parliamentary elections.47 Many
perceived Mr. Hariri to be at the heart of the power bloc. 48
B. Murder
Mr. Hariri was leaving a café at about 1 pm, just passing outside the Hotel St. Georges,
when an explosion killed him and 22 others, and injured over 220 persons.49 He was traveling in
a motorcade of six cars with his security detail and a Member of Parliament, Bassel Fleyhan
when the explosion occurred, 50 caused by a thousand kilograms of trinitrotoluene. 51 The route

42

On October 1, 2004 Hamadeh was the subject of an attempted assassination. Marwan Hamadeh Escapes
Assassination Bid, MIDDLE EAST ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2004, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=11437
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]. See also U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note
34, at.¶ 13; and Mehlis Report, supra note 12, at 7.
43

U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note 34, at ¶ 13.

44

Mehlis Report, supra note 12, at 7.

45

U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note 34, at ¶ 13.

46

Id. at ¶ 14.

47

Id.

48

Id. (“At the centre of this power bloc one man stood as its perceived architect: the former Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri.”).

49

50
51

Id. at ¶ 24-26; Mehlis Report, supra note 12, at ¶ 140-141.
Id. at ¶ 140.
U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note 34, at 2.

8

to leave the café was only communicated to the lead car as Mr. Hariri was leaving the café.52
This route had only been used by Mr. Hariri six times in the three months preceeding the
explosion.53
After the explosion, Al-Jazeera TV received a phone call claiming responsibility for the
explosion. The caller stated that “‘the Nasra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria claims
responsibility for the execution of the agent Rafik Hariri, in the name of the oppressed, the Nasra
and the Jihad.’”54 A second call was made to Al-Jazeera informing them of the location of a tape
and requesting the tape to be aired on television.55 The tape showed Ahmad Abu Adas “claiming
responsibility for the killing of Mr. Hariri on behalf of the Nasra and Jihad Group in Greater
Syria.”56
C. Lebanese Investigation
After the explosion Judge Rasheed Mezhar of the Military Court took over the
investigation of the crime.57 There were several shortcomings in the investigation. The site of
the explosion was not sufficiently secured to preserve all available evidence.58 No record was
kept of people entering and leaving the scene or of removal or placing of items at the scene.59
The vehicles making up Mr. Hariri’s convoy were removed from the scene of the crime to be

52

Id. at ¶ 25.

53

Id. at ¶ 26.

54

Id. at ¶ 37.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id. at ¶ 32.

58

Id. at ¶ 34.

59

Id. at ¶ 35.

9

held at the Helou Police Barracks.60 The resulting crater from the explosion was allowed to be
filled with water, damaging evidence.61 Also, evidence was planted by security services.62 In
addition, without judicial authority, intelligence agencies investigated the explosion site and
failed to coordinate their findings. 63 The failure of the Lebanese investigators to use proper
investigative methods likely resulted in the loss of important evidence and made it difficult for
the UN Commission to determine key factors about the crime.64
D. UN Involvement/Investigation
On February 18 2005, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, announced the
establishment of a Fact-finding mission to gather information on the murder of Mr. Hariri.65 The
UN Fact-finding mission arrived in Beirut on February 25 and concluded its mission on March
16, 2005.66 After receiving the report of the Fact-finding mission, the UN passed Resolution
1595, to establish the International Independent Investigation Commission (“Commission”); a
three month commission to investigate the bombing.67 The Commission issued its first report on
October 19, 2005.68 The report contained information about how the assassination occurred, the
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Mehlis Report, supra note 12, at ¶ 147.
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U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Lebanon, supra note 34, at ¶ 2.
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Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Establishes Commission to Assist Investigation into Beirut
Bombing That Killed Former Lebanese Prime Minister, U.N. Doc. SC/8353 (July 4, 2005) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 6]. S.C. Res. 1595, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1595 (Apr. 7, 2005) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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Mehlis Report, supra note 12.
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planning involved in the assassination, and explained what further steps needed to be taken to
complete the investigation. After the report was issued, the Security Council decided to extend
the term of the Commission until December 15, 2005 to continue its investigation.69 A second
report was issued by the Commission on December 10, 2005.70 At this time the Commission had
not completed the investigation, so the UN further extended the term of the Commission, in
Resolution 1664, until June 15, 2006.71 This Resolution also allowed the Commission to expand
the scope of its investigation to include other terrorist attacks that had occurred in Lebanon since
October 2004.72
Detlev Mehlis, the head of the Commission,73 in his first report to the UN, made several
conclusions about the how the crime occurred, who the perpetrators were, and what further steps
needed to be taken.74 The evidence gathered by the Commission indicated that the perpetrators
were part of an organized operation, which included the use of improvised explosive devices, “a
pattern of threats against targeted individuals,” the participation of Lebanese and Syrian security
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S.C. Res. 1636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (Oct. 31, 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
Int’l Indep. Investigation Comm’n, Second Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1595 (2005) and 1636 (2005), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/775
(Dec. 10, 2005) (prepared by Detlev Mehlis) [hereinafter Second Report of IIIC] [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 4].
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Second Report of IIIC, supra note 69.
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S.C. Res. 1644, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1644 (Dec. 15, 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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Id. (“Authorizes the Commission, following the request of the Lebanese Government, to extend its technical
assistance as appropriate to the Lebanese authorities with regard to their investigations on the terrorist attacks
perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004, and requests the Secretary-General in consultations with the
Commission and the Lebanese Government to present recommendations to expand the mandate of the Commission
to include investigations of those other attacks.”)
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Mehlis stepped down as Commissioner and was replaced by Serge Bremertz in January 2006. Syria Raising
Funds to Pay for Defense of Hariri Murder Suspects, YALIBNAN, Apr. 22, 2006,
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/04/syria_raising_f.php [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
49].
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officials, and the “planning of other criminal activities.” 75 Mehlis concluded that the
assassination of Mr. Hariri could not have taken place “without the approval of top-ranked
Syrian security officials and could not have been further organized without the collusion of their
counterparts in the Lebanese security services.”76 Mr. Hariri’s phones were wire tapped to allow
the Lebanese and Syrian intelligence and security officials to monitor his contacts and
movements.77 The use of prepaid phone cards was also instrumental in the monitoring of Mr.
Hariri’s movements.78 There was little difficulty, given the amount of surveillance conducted on
Mr. Hariri, for an individual “outside of Hariri’s ‘inner circle’ to predict the route that his convoy
would follow” on the date of his death.79
There was a suggestion by witnesses that roadwork had been done in front of the St.
George Hotel prior to the assassination allowing for an opportunity for the perpetrators to place a
bomb underneath the road.80 However, the Commission was not able to independently verify
whether excavation work did in fact occur.81 The bomb was most likely carried on a white
Mitsubishi van seen at the scene of the explosion prior to the explosion.82 However, the
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New Evidence Points to Syrian Involvement in Hariri Murder, UN NEWS SERVICES, Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=16917 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
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Mehlis Report, supra note 12, at ¶ 124.
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Commission was not able to determine how the IED was activated.83 There were jamming
devices in Mr. Hariri’s convoy that were operational at the time of the explosion.84
The Commission also looked at the involvement of Abu Adass in the murder of Mr.
Hariri.85 The Commission determined that there was no evidence indicating that a suicide
bombing had occurred.86 There was some evidence, though not conclusive, indicating that the
Syrians used Adass as a decoy in the assassination attempt.87 Mehlis was only able to conclude
that Adass left his home on January 16, 2005 and was taken to Syria where he disappeared.88
The Commission, though permitted by Resolution 1664, has not expanded the scope of
its investigation outside of the murder of Mr. Hariri. However, the UN has been providing
technical assistance to the Lebanese in the investigation of other terrorist attacks that have
occurred in Lebanon.89
E. Syrian Investigation
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Id. at ¶¶ 177-191.
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Starting with the attempted assassination of Marwan Hamadeh in October 2004 till the murder of Gebran Tueni in
December 2005 there have been a number of bombings that have occurred in Lebanon. On March 19, 2005 a bomb
was set off in Jdeideh wounding 11 people. On March 23, 2005 three people died and three people were wounded
due to an explosion north of Beirut. On March 26, 2005 six people were injured by a suitcase bomb. On May 6,
2005 twenty-nine people are injured by a bomb. On June 2, 2005 Samir Kasir dies when his car explodes. On June
21, 2005 George Hawi, former Lebanese Communist Party leader dies when his car explodes. On July 12, 2005
Defence Minister Elias Murr is wounded and two other people die in a car bomb. On September 25, 2005 a car
bomb injures May Chidiac. Id. at 7-9. On December 12, 2005 Tueni was killed in a car bomb blast. Transcript of
Tape Recording at 9, The Struggle for Lebanese Independence: One Year After Hariri’s Assassination (Mar. 6,
2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060306.pdf [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 50].
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On October 29, 2005 legislation was passed creating a Syrian Judicial Commission to
investigate the murder of Mr. Hariri.90 However, there is doubt that the Syrian Judicial
Commission is determined to conduct an independent and professional investigation of the
crime.91 For example, the Syrian Judicial Commission pressured one of the sources to the UN
Commission, whose statements were independently verified, to appear on Syrian television and
recant his prior statements to the UN Commission.92 Syria has, also, shown a history of not
cooperating with the UN Commission.93
F. Suspects
On August 30, 2005 Lebanese authorities arrested four high-ranking Lebanese
intelligence and security officials.94 On October 16, 2005 Zuhir Ibn Mohamed Said Saddik was
arrested in France.95 As of the second report by the Commission to the UN there were 19
suspects in the murder of Mr. Hariri.96
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Referral by the Security Council to the ICC Pursuant to Article 13(b)
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Second Report of IIIC, supra note 69, at ¶ 7.
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Id. at ¶ 30.
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94

Id. at ¶ 174 (“The individuals arrested were General Jamil Al-Sayyed, former director-general of the Surete
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and General Mustapha Hamdan, Commander of the Republican Guard Brigade.”); Barbara Slavin, U.S., France
Consider U.N. Sanctions Against Syria, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/200510-23-syriaaction_x.htm [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
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Second Report of IIIC, supra note 69, at ¶ 27.
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Second Report of IIIC, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 5 & 27; EU Will Impose Sanctions on Suspects in Hariri’s Murder,
YALIBNAN, Feb. 23, 2006, http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/eu_will_impose.php [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
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The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over crimes that are within its jurisdiction according to
Article 5 when “a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed
is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations.”97 Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the Security Council with the
power to determine what measures shall be taken to “maintain or restore international peace and
security.”98 Pursuant to these powers the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan
to the ICC in 2005. This is the first referral that the UN has made to the ICC. The ICC accepted
the referral and began an investigation.99 The referral of Darfur serves as an example of the
procedure the Prosecutor follows to determine whether to accept a referral and begin an
investigation.
1. Darfur, Sudan
On March 31, 2005 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1593 referring the
situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC Prosecutor.100 Resolution 1593 was adopted pursuant to
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.101 Sudan, however, is not a party to the Rome Statute.102

97

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 13(b).
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U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at art. 39. Article 39 of the UN Charter states: “The security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.” Id.
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Louis Moreno Ocampo, Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Louis Moreno
Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) 5 (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC_Darfur_UNSC_Report_29-06-05_EN.pdf [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 20]; see also Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo to the
Security Council on 29 June 2005 Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/LMO_UNSC_On_DARFUR-EN.pdf [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
7]. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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Accordingly, the UN stated in the Resolution that all parties to the conflict should cooperate with
the ICC and the prosecutor, but recognized that non-State parties do not have any obligations
under the Rome Statute.103
Upon receiving the referral from the Security Council, ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo assessed the referral under Article 53 to determine whether to commence an
investigation.104 After considering all of the information available to him he concluded, on June
1, 2005, that there was a reasonable basis to start an investigation.105 Pursuant to Article 53, the
Prosecutor considered three factors: (1) whether the crimes were within the jurisdiction of the
Court, (2) whether the case is admissible under Article 17, and (3) whether the commencement
of an investigation would not “serve the interests of justice.” 106
102

International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties.html (Nov. 14,
2005) [reproduced in Tab 19].
103

S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 100. Resolution 1593 states in part:
Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor
pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have
no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international
organizations to cooperate fully.
Id. at ¶ 2. But see Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in
International Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 789-90 (2003) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 33] (“The Statute is intended to create a Court that will have jurisdiction over crimes
committed outside the territory of states party to it and over nationals of states not party to it, whenever the
Security Council refers a situation to the Court.”).
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See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur to ICC Prosecutor,
(Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/98.html [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 21].
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Louis Moreno Ocampo, supra note 98. See also Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo to the Security Council on 29 June 2005 Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), supra note 98.
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Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 53. Article 53 states in part:
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this
Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(a)
The information available to the Prosecutor provides reasonable basis to believe that a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed;
(b)

The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
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Considering the first factor the Prosecutor determined that there were several crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, including the killing of thousands of civilians, the looting and
destruction of villages, a pattern of sexual violence and rape, the deaths of vulnerable groups due
to disease and starvation, and the targeting and intimidation of persons offering humanitarian
relief.107 Under the second factor the Prosecutor must determine whether the ICC has
jurisdiction over the crimes. The ICC is considered to be a court of last resort. Therefore, the
ICC should only intervene when: “1) there is not or has not been any national investigation or
prosecution of the cases; 2) where there is or has been an investigation or prosecution, but they
are vitiated by an unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out the investigation or
prosecution.”108 The Prosecutor determined that there were crimes in relation to the Darfur
situation that would be admissible. Because there were no criminal proceedings in Sudan for the
crimes that the Prosecutor would focus on he determined that crimes were within the ICC’s
jurisdiction.109 Though the Prosecutor initially determined that the crimes are admissible, he
stated that “the admissibility assessment is an on-going assessment that relates to the specific
cases to be prosecuted by the Court. Once investigations have been carried out, and specific
cases selected, the OTP will assess whether or not these cases are being, or have been, the
subject of genuine national investigations or prosecutions.110 Therefore, the initial determination
of admissibility, when determining to begin an investigation, is not conclusive as to the
(c)
Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, there are
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.
Id. at art. 53(1).
107

Ocampo, supra note 99, at 2-3.
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Id. at 3.
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Id. at 4.
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admissibility of the case at a later date. In addition, the Prosecutor determined that “there were
no substantial reasons to believe that the investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”111
2. Statutory Requirements for the Prosecutor to Take the Hariri Case
Upon receiving a referral from the UN Security Council the ICC Prosecutor will begin an
investigation unless he determines that there is no reasonable basis to start an investigation.112
Considering the three factors under Article 53 there most likely is no reasonable basis for the
ICC to accept the case of the murder of Mr. Hariri.
a. There Is No Reasonable Basis to Believe That a Crime Within the ICC’s
Jurisdiction Has Occurred.
There is no reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC has
occurred. Of the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction the murder of Mr. Hariri is best analyzed
as a crime against humanity.113 All, but one, of the elements for a crimes against humanity are
satisified by the murder of Mr. Hariri. Section C of this memorandum addresses this issue in
more detail.
b. The Case May Be Admissible Under Article 17.
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Id. at 5.
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Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 53; see also International Criminal Court, Annex to the “Paper on some policy
issues before the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications, http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy_annex_final_210404.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 18]. Cf. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, supra note 10, at rule 48 (“In determining whether
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under article 15, paragraph 3, the Prosecutor shall
consider the factors set out in Article 53, paragraph 1 (a) to (c).”).
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Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5(1)(b).
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Article 17 discusses four situations in which a case is inadmissible to the Court.114 The
situations described in Article 17(1)(b) and (c) are not applicable because the case has not moved
beyond an investigation yet. Article 17(1)(d) also does not apply because the case is of sufficient
gravity to justify action by the ICC.115 The only situation that may apply is that described in
Article 17(1)(a). Under this Article the ICC should not accept the case if “the case is being
investigated…by a State which has jurisdiction over it.”116 If, however, the State investigating
the case is “unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation” then the ICC may
exercise jurisdiction over the case.117 A State is determined to be unwilling to “genuinely carry
out the investigation” if the investigation is “not being conducted independently or
impartially.”118
The murder of Mr. Hariri was initially investigated only by Lebanon. This investigation
was not conducted “independently or impartially” because there was a general failure by the

114

Id. at art 17. Article states the following:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it,
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted for the unwillingness or
inability of the State to genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the
complain, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.

Id. at 53(1).
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See infra Section III(A)(2)(c).
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Id. at art. 17.
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investigators to use proper investigative methods.119 The negligence of the Lebanese
investigators have made it difficult for the Commission to determine key factors about the crime,
such as whether the explosion occurred above or below ground.120 The Lebanese people have
also expressed their mistrust of “their security and judicial authorities” to the UN Commission.121
Therefore, the investigation was not carried out with the intent of bringing the perpetrators to
justice.122
In April 2005 the UN began its own independent investigation of the murder of Mr.
Hariri. The Lebanese authorities have been cooperating with the Commission in its
investigation. The UN, however, is not considered to be a “State” and therefore its investigation
is not encompassed by Article 17(1)(a).
In October 2005, Syria set up a Judicial Commission to investigate the murder of Mr.
Hariri.123 Article 17(1)(a) most likely applies to Syria’s investigation. Syria arguably has
jurisdiction over the case because some of the suspects are Syrian officials.124 The Syrian
investigation, however, is not being conducted “independently or impartially.”125 For example,
one of the sources to the UN Commission, whose statements were independently verified,

119
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Mehlis Report, supra note 12, at ¶ 147.
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Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17(2)(c) (“The proceedings were…being carried out in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”).
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Second Report of IIIC, supra note 69, at ¶ 7.
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See supra section II(F).
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Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17(2)(c).
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appeared on Syrian television recanting his prior statements to the UN Commission “at the
behest of the Syrian Judicial Commission.”126
When the situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC the Prosecutor determined that the
case was admissible under Article 17 because there were no criminal proceedings in Sudan for
the crimes that had been committed.127 According to this reasoning, the ICC also has jurisdiction
over the murder of Mr. Hariri because no criminal proceedings are underway in Lebanon or
Syria. Also, Lebanon has been meeting with the UN to set up an international forum to try the
suspects involved in the murder of Mr. Hariri.128 If the UN refers the situation to the ICC then
presumably Lebanon has agreed to the case being tried in front of the ICC. Therefore, the case
would be admissible because the ICC would be the sole venue for the criminal proceedings.
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Second Report of IIIC, supra note 69, at ¶ 30.

127

Ocampo, supra note 99, at 4.
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Detlev Mehlis, Comm’r Int’l Indep. Investigation Comm’n , United Nations Security Council Meting to Discuss
the Mehlis Report (Dec. 13, 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41] (“Lebanese government
requested today from the Security Council to establish an international court, to be held in Lebanon or outside it, and
which tries everyone it finds involved in the terrorist crime which claimed the life of Prime Minister Hariri and the
Representative Bassel Fleihan and their companions.”); see also Brammertz Meets Syria’s Moallem on Hariri
Probe, YALIBNAN, Feb. 23, 2006, http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/brammertz_meets.php [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 40] (“The UN has already begun discussions with the government in Beirut on
the nature of the tribunal, the identity of the judges and the venue.”); Rym Ghazal, Judges Visit UN to Discuss
Hariri Trial, THE DAILY STAR, Feb. 20, 2006,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=22342 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 48] (“A delegation of two Lebanese judges will heading to the UN Headquarters in
New York Monday or Tuesday, where they will present Lebanon’s ‘vision’ of the specifics of an international curt
to try those accused of the assassination of former Premier Rafik Hariri); Lebanese Judges Head to UN for Talks on
Hariri Tribunal, LEBANONWIRE, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.lebanonwire.com/0602LN/06022101LWAF.asp
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44] (UN Security General Kofi Annan’s legal advisor Nicolas
Michel “held talks in Beirut in January with Lebanese officials on how best to create a tribunal having an
international character in conformity with UN Security Council resolution 1644.”); Tribunal of Hariri Assassination
to Be Set, ARABICNEWS.COM, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/060126/2006012618.html [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 51] (the UN will discuss with Lebanese authorities “the nature and scope of the international assistance
needed to create a tribunal to try those charged with the killing of former Prime Minister Hariri and others.”). S.C.
Res. 1664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]. The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1644 (2005), U.N. Doc.
S/2006/176 (Mar. 21, 2006) [reproduced at Tab 15].
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There would be no issues of complementarity of jurisdiction.129 In addition, the ICC has shown
a practice of accepting cases even when the specific language of Article 17 is not met.130
Therefore, the case is most likely admissible under Article 17.
c. There Are No Substantial Reasons to Believe That an Investigation Would
Not Serve the Interests of Justice.
There are no substantial reasons to believe that an investigation of the murder of Mr.
Hariri would not serve justice. The Lebanese people are insistent upon a tribunal of an
international nature to ensure the impartiality of the court.131 The Lebanese people do not place
much trust in their judicial and security authorities.132 Lebanon and the international community
have displayed a strong interest in prosecuting those who murdered Mr. Hariri and the 22 others
who died in the explosion.133 In the wake of the death of Mr. Hariri there has been much turmoil
in Lebanon.134 The prosecution of the perpetrators may help to stabilize the situation in
Lebanon.135 There is also an interest in prosecuting perpetrators before an international court to
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See generally Xabier Agirre et al., Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice (2003),
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add more reliability to the process. In addition, prosecution of the perpetrators is desired to deter
future crimes of this nature and to promote security in Lebanon and in the region.136 Since the
assassination of Mr. Hariri, there have already been a number of other murders of political
figures involved in the opposition movement, such as Gebran Tueni.137
B. Crimes Against Humanity
There is most likely no reasonable basis to believe that the murder of Mr. Hariri is a
crime against humanity. Crimes against humanity are within the jurisdiction of the ICC under
Article 5. The Court is only able to accept crimes which are of “concern to the international
community as a whole.”138 The murder of Mr. Hariri can be said to be of concern to the
international community. Considering the political climate in Lebanon prior to and after the
death of Mr. Hariri there is reason to believe that this crime rises to the level of requiring
international attention. Notably, after the death of Mr. Hariri, the UN, along with the United
States and Europe, placed pressure on Syria to pull out of Lebanon, finally putting into effect the
UN resolution requiring the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon.139 A crime against humanity,
however, requires that it be committed against a civilian population and this requirement cannot
be fulfilled, even if the murder of Mr. Hariri is taken along with other acts of terrorism that have
occurred in Lebanon.140
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1. Legislative History of Crimes Against Humanity and the Rome Statute
Crimes against humanity were first defined and codified in the Nuremburg Charter.141
Subsequent codifications of crimes against humanity were enacted in the statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).142 The ICC codified crimes against humanity during
the Rome Conference, which met from July 15 to July 17, 1998.143 During the Rome
Conference, the discussion on crimes against humanity focused on whether there should be a
nexus with armed conflict, whether the widespread or systematic elements should be
comprehensive or disjunctive, and whether a discriminatory motive should be required.144 A
discriminatory intent was not included in the final version of the Rome Statute because France
was the only country advocating for the inclusion of such a requirement. 145 Ultimately the
Rome Statute took a disjunctive approach to the widespread and systematic requirements. The
Canadian delegation submitted a proposal for the chapeau to crimes against humanity, on July 1,
that was designed as a compromise to those countries who wanted widespread and systematic to
be conjunctive requirements.146 The proposed chapeau was based on the ICTY’s judgment in
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(1) For the purpose of the present Statute a crime against humanity means any of the following
acts when knowingly committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
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(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) “attack against any civilian population” means a course of
conduct involving the commission of multiple acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian
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Tadic that “‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ should be treated as alternatives and that the definition
should require a showing of governmental, organizational, or group policy.”147 The Bureau of
the Committee issued a Discussion Paper, on July 6, that contained a compromise proposal,
similar to the Canadian proposal, which was ultimately adopted as Article 7 of the Rome
Statute.148 The final version of the Rome Statute thus adopted the disjunctive approach to the
elements of widespread and systematic and is reflective of “the position taken by most recent
authorities, including the ICTY in the Tadic case.”149 The Rome Statute also “does not require a
nexus to an ‘armed conflict’”150 reflecting “the current state of international law.”151

population, pursuant to or knowingly in furtherance of a governmental or organizational policy to
commit those acts.
Id. at 497 (quoting Canadian Delegation, Background Paper on Some Jurisprudence on Crimes Against Humanity
(July 1, 1998)).
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knowledge of the attack:…
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a)
“Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack;...
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 7.
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2. Elements of Crimes Against Humanity152
There are three elements to a crime against humanity with the act constituting murder:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to
be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 153
The second element can be broken down further into two components: (1) the existence of a
widespread or systematic attack and (2) against a civilian population. When considering whether
the elements of the crime have been met the statutory language defining the crime should be read
narrowly.154 Article 22 states that “the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall
not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”155 When considering a case, Article 21
allows the ICC to look outside the Rome Statute to other sources of international law.156 The
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murder of Mr. Hariri meets all but one of the elements for the commission of a crime against
humanity. The murder most likely does not satisfy the “population” requirement in the second
element of the crime. This shall be discussed further in subsection c below.
a. One or More Persons Killed
The first element to be considered is whether a murder was committed.157 Clearly this
element has been met because Mr. Hariri along with 22 others died in the explosion that occurred
on February 14, 2005.158 According to the Elements of Crimes “[t]he term ‘killed’ is
interchangeable with the term ‘caused death’.”159 As the explosion caused the death of Mr.
Hariri and 22 others, the perpetrators of the explosion committed murder.
b. Existence of a Widespread or Systematic Attack
The chapeau of Article 7 requires that the act committed, murder, be part of a widespread
or systematic attack.160 The widespread or systematic nature of an attack are jurisdictional
elements of the crime.161 The terms are not defined within the Rome Statute, but have come to
have a common meaning when used.162 Widespread means an action that occurs on a large-scale
that involves “a substantial number of victims.”163 A systematic attack refers to one that
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“requires a high degree of orchestration and methodical planning.”164 The murder of Mr. Hariri
does not constitute a widespread attack, but may constitute a systematic attack.
Though the International Law Commission has stated that “the ‘singular effect of an
inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude’” can be characterized as being widespread such a
crime of that magnitude did not occur.165 The murder of 23 people does not likely constitute a
crime of “extraordinary magnitude.”166 Similarly, the ICTR defined a widespread attack “as
massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable, seriousness and
directed against a multiplicity of victims.”167 The ICTY, also, has stated that widespreadness
“refers to the number of victims.”168 The murder of Mr. Hariri does not meet any of the
definitions of a widespread attack.
The ICTR cited the International Law Commission in articulating the definition of
systematic. The ICTR in Akayesu characterized a systematic attack as being “thoroughly
organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial
public or private resources.”169 The Akayesu decision was written subsequent to the adoption of
the Rome Statute “and explicitly takes the ICC definition into account in formulating the
164
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required elements of crimes against humanity.”170 The ICTY characterizes systematic as a
“pattern or methodical plan.”171 The Commissioner of the International Independent
Investigation, Detlev Mehlis, stated in his report that a great deal of planning went into the
assassination of Mr. Hariri, which required access to lots of resources.172 In his report, Mehlis
concluded that the assassination “was carried out by a group with…extensive organization and
considerable resources and capabilities.”173 Mr. Hariri was monitored for a month prior to his
death, and the perpetrators went to great lengths to make the crime look as though it was
committed by a suicide bomber.174 Therefore, the murder of Mr. Hariri was a systematic attack.
c. Against a Civilian Population
The chapeau also requires that the attack be directed against “any civilian population.”175
The Rome Statute defines “attack directed against any civilian population” as “a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack.”176 There are three parts to this definition: (1) that the attack be against a civilian
population, (2) that there be multiple commission of acts, and (3) that the attack be “in
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furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”177 The requirements are present to avoid the
inclusion of random, isolated acts within the purview of crimes against humanity.178
The civilian population element “has been interpreted to include two elements: (1) the
constituent acts must be directed against noncombatants and (2) a large number of victims must
be targeted.”179 The ICTY has interpreted the term civilian population to imply a course of
conduct and to exclude isolated acts.180 All those who died in the explosion involving Mr.
Hariri’s convoy were civilians. However, a large number of victims were not targeted. The
murder of 22 people does not rise to the level of expressing a “population.” If the murder of Mr.
Hariri is taken in the context of the other terrorist attacks that have occurred in Lebanon, that
may have been perpetrated by the same individuals, then the number of people who were
targeted rises. 181 However, even then the number of people who were murdered does not reach
the numbers present in cases that have prosecuted crimes against humanity before other courts.
The attached chart shows that in all crimes against humanity cases the prosecuted crime always
took place in the context of thousands of people dieing. The murder of Mr. Hariri does not take
place in such a context.
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The ICC only takes crimes of sufficient gravity that rise to the level of an international
crime.182 Though there is much international attention around the murder of Mr. Hariri, the
numbers of victims does not raise it to the level of sufficient gravity. The ICC is a court of last
resort and the Rome Statute “places primary responsibility on states to investigate and prosecute
crimes.”183 Article 22, also, states that “the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed.”184
In addition, when considering whether to initiate an investigation the Prosecutor should be
mindful of the resources of the ICC.185 Given all of the policy concerns for the ICC the murder
of 22 people most likely does not rise to the level of constituting a “population.”
The second element in attacks directed against a civilian population requires there to be a
multiple commission of acts. The multiple commission of acts implies that more than one attack
needs to occur to establish a crime against humanity. However, as the Indian delegate to the
Rome Conference stated, “‘anything more than one could be multiple.’” 186 In addition, the
ICTY has indicated that a single act by a perpetrator can be a crime against humanity and that
numerous attacks need not occur for the perpetrator to be held liable.187 If the view of the Indian
delegate is taken then the murder of 22 people may constitute multiple commissions. Perhaps a
better argument, would be to place Mr. Hariri’s murder in the context of other terrorist attacks
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that have occurred in Lebanon and in that manner satisfy the requirement of multiple
commission of acts.
d. In Furtherance of a State or Organizational Policy to Commit Such an
Attack.
The third component to the definition of “attack directed against any civilian population”
is that the attack be “in furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”188 The inclusion of this
requirement, as interpreted by the ICTY and the International Law Commission, is to require
some degree of involvement of States or organizations in a crime against humanity.189 Another
reason for the inclusion of a policy requirement is to make sure that the attack is not isolated, but
in furtherance of a broader policy.190 Article 21 indicates that the ICC may look outside the
Statute to other sources of international law in order to interpret cases.191 The ICC may want to
rely on the interpretation of the ICTY when considering if the murder of Mr. Hariri was “in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”192 The ICTY does not require formal proof of a
policy, but is “willing to infer policy from the way acts are committed.” 193 This would be the
best approach for the ICC because it would allow the ICC to maintain the elements of a
widespread and systematic attack as alternatives.194 In addition, the ICTY’s treatment of the
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policy question in Tadic is of particular importance because the Canadian proposal during the
Rome Conference was based on the ICTY’s decision in Tadic.195
The policy element does not require “proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all
characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy.”196 This element is met if
the perpetrator had the intention of furthering a policy of attacks against the civilian
population.197 In the case of the murder of Mr. Hariri the policy there was most likely a policy of
intimidation and repression of the opposition movement in Lebanon. Evidence of the policy can
be inferred from the tense political situation present in Lebanon, as well as, the threats that were
made to Mr. Hariri and other political figures involved in the opposition movement. The Report
of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon stated that Syria propagated “a culture of intimidation
and impunity” within Lebanon.198 The murder of Mr. Hariri was in furtherance of this policy
because it eliminated Mr. Hariri as a contender in the upcoming parliamentary elections and may
have been intended to intimidate other members of the opposition movement. After the
attempted murder of Marwan Hemadeh, opposition leaders such as Mr. Hariri and Jumblatt
feared for their lives and saw the attempted assassination as Syria’s way of trying to maintain
control of Lebanon.199 Therefore, there was a policy of political intimidation.
e. Mens Rea- Knowledge
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The last element in the chapeau is that of a mens rea of knowledge.200 The perpetrator
must know that his conduct or intend that his conduct “be part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population.”201 Article 30 provides guidance on the definitions of
knowledge and intent.202 Intention is defined in terms of conduct and consequence and
knowledge is defined in terms of circumstances.203 Case law from the ICTY and ICTR has
indicated that knowledge of an attack can be constructive or actual.204
In his report to the UN, Mehlis stated that there was no way that the murder of Mr. Hariri
could have occurred without the knowledge and approval of top-ranking Syrian and Lebanese
security officials.205 In addition, the intent element can be satisfied. A person has the requisite
intent when he “means to engage in the conduct” and he “means to cause the consequence.” The
setting up of an explosion to occur and resulting death of Mr. Hariri due to the explosion meet
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2. For the purpose of this article, a person has intent where:
a. In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
b. In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or
a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be
construed accordingly.
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the intention requirements, particularly when as Mehlis states the whole crime could not have
occurred without the participation of the security officials. In addition, in the Commission’s
second report to the UN, Mehlis states that “after the assassination of Mr. Hariri, a high-level
Syrian official supplied arms and ammunition to groups and individuals in Lebanon in order to
create public disorder in response to any accusations of Syrian involvement.”206 Though, this is
circumstantial evidence, it may be used to build up the case in favor of showing that the security
officials had the requisite mens rea.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the UN Security Council refers the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to the
ICC there most likely is no reasonable basis for the Prosecutor to begin an investigation. Three
factors must be considered when determining whether to initiate an investigation. First, a crime
within the jurisdiction of the ICC must have occurred. The murder of Mr. Hariri does not
constitute a crime against humanity because the murder of 23 people does not satisfy the
definition of “population.” However, all the other elements of a crime against humanity are
satisfied. Murder was committed as part of a systematic attack directed against civilians in
furtherance of a policy of political intimidation. Second, the case must be admissible under
Article 17 of the Rome Statute. The murder of Mr. Hariri is admissible under Article 17 because
none of the situations prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction are present. Third, there must be no
substantial reasons to believe that an acceptance of the case would not serve the interests of
justice. No such reasons are present in this case. There are reasons to indicate that an
international trial would better further the interests of justice than if a trial were to occur in
Lebanon. Despite the satisfaction of most of the factors for the initiation of an investigation the
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ICC will most likely not accept a referral from the UN Security Council of the murder of Mr.
Hariri because the gravity of the crime is not sufficient to satisfy all of the elements of a crime
against humanity.
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Chart 1 – Number of Victims Sufficient for Crimes Against Humanity207
Court

Defendant

Crime

East
Timor

Benjamin
Sarmento

Murder
and Deportation

Deputy
Commander of
the Tim Sasarat
Ablai

East
Timor

LieutenantColonel
Soedjarwo

Number Directly
Victimized by
Defendant
5 killed
Thousands
deported

Failing to prevent
the killing of
Timorese

0

Florida

Mateus Lao

Murder

One man was
killed by Lao after
trying to escape
from East Timor

Sakunar militia
member

Armando
Fernandez
Larios
Chilean Military
Officer

ICTR

Eliezer
Niyitigeka
Information
Minister of
Rwanda

ICTR

Jean Paul
Akayesu

Direct participation
in an extra-judicial
killing squad (the
“Caravan of Death”)

One complaint,
but several
mentioned as part
of the action

Murder,
extermination, rape,
and inhumane acts

Around 10 people
were killed or
raped by
Niyitigeka
himself.

Did not prevent
murder,

Judgment

12,000 deported by
Sarmento’s group

12 years in prison
for crimes against
humanity

250,000 total
victims in East
Timor crisis
Over 1,000
250,000 total
victims in East
Timor crisis

Indonesian
Military Chief

East
Timor

Total Number of
Victims

His most
damaging actions
were his
incitement of
genocide via
propaganda on
Rwandan radio
One murder by
Akayesu himself
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n/a—an
apparently
isolated incident
250,000 total
victims in East
Timor crisis
70 by Larios’
Caravan of Death
2,603 under
Pinochet

800,000 killed
during entire
Rwanda crisis

2,000 killed in
Taba while

5 years in prison
for crimes against
humanity

8 years in prison
for crimes
against
humanity

Found liable for,
inter alia,
crimes against
humanity and
was instructed to
pay $4 million
in damages
Life in prison
for crimes
against
humanity and
genocide

Life in prison for
crimes against

Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Did the Execution of Baghdad Merchants in July of 1992 Amount to Any Crimes
Within the Jurisdiction of the Iraqi Special Tribunal? 47, chart 1 (Summer 2005), www.law.case.edu/War-CrimesResearch-Portal.
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Mayor of Taba

ICTY

Dario Kordic

extermination,
inhumane acts,
torture, and rape
Participated in a
murder
Ordering a massacre

Vice-president of
the Bosnian Croat
Republic

ICTY

Dragoljub
Kunarac
Commander in
the Serb Army

Rape, torture, and
enslavement

11 were killed
under Akayesu’s
orders

Ordered the
massacre of
hundreds

At least 16 raped
by Kunarac
himself

Akayesu was
mayor
800,000 killed
during entire
Rwanda crisis
Hundreds because
of his orders
200,000 killed
during entire
Balkan crisis
Dozens raped by
Kunarac and his
platoon
200,000 killed
during entire
Balkan crisis
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humanity (also
convicted of
genocide)

25 years in prison
for, inter alia,
crimes against
humanity

28 years in prison
for, inter alia,
crimes against
humanity

